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Which States Enter into Treaties, and Why? 
Thomas J. Miles & Eric A. Posner1 
July 11, 2008 
 
 
Abstract. Treaties are the primary source of international law. But little is known about which countries enter 
into treaties, which forms the treaties take, and which subjects they address. We present an exploratory analysis 
of a unique dataset of roughly 50,000 treaties ratified since 1946. We hypothesize that states enter treaties in 
order to obtain public goods but that the transaction costs of negotiating and enforcing treaties also limit the 
value of treaties. Simple predictions are that larger and richer states should benefit more from cooperation: 
therefore, they should be parties to more treaties. Older, less corrupt, and (again) larger states should face lower 
transaction costs and should belong to more treaties. Consistent with this prediction, these states enter into 
more bilateral treaties and “closed” multilateral treaties, but universal multilateral treaties where the benefits of 
cooperation are more attenuated and the costs of negotiation are low for small states. 
 
 One of the most striking trends in international relations since World War II has 
been the proliferation of treaties. States have entered more than 45,000 bilateral treaties and 
8,000 multilateral treaties since World War II, including more than 600 multilateral treaties 
sponsored by the United Nations. Although there are no reliable data on treaties prior to 
World War II, there is no doubt that the rate of treaty-making, at least among the most 
active states, has increased dramatically since then. Why do some states enter so many 
treaties while others enter into so few? 
 The standard answer to this question is that states enter treaties in order to obtain 
gains from cooperation. But this answer is only the beginning of the analysis. Not only do 
some states enter more treaties than others, some enter certain types of treaties (trade, 
human rights) more than others. Some states prefer multilateral treaties to bilateral treaties; 
among states that enter multilateral treaties, some issue reservations more than others. States 
entering bilateral treaties choose different treaty partners and choose different number of 
treaties to make with each partner. The simple assertion that treaty-making occurs when it 
generates gains for the participating states is insufficient to explain variations across these 
dimensions of treaty-making.  
                                                 
1 The University of Chicago Law School. Comments are most welcome at tmiles “at” law.uchicago.edu and 
eposner “at” uchicago.edu. Early drafts of this research were presented at a conference in Bonn, Germany, at 
the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, 2007, Northwestern, Harvard, and Stanford. 
We are grateful to participants at those workshops for comments, especially Stefan Voigt, Daniel Drezner, and 
Alan Sykes. We thank Yuon Jin (Ann) Choi, Kim Foley, Nicholas Pontzer, Luke Thara, Daniel Zainulbhai, and 
especially Gregory Pesce for research assistance. 
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 Many empirical regularities of treaty-making remain almost entirely unknown. Basic 
facts, such as which types of treaties countries most commonly enter and which types of 
countries engage in the most treaty-making – let alone what are the consequences of treaty-
making – have not been established. Political scientists have begun to analyze treaty activity 
in a serious empirical fashion only in the past few years. So far, the literature has focused on 
compliance with treaties (e.g., Simmons 2006) and not on signature and ratification.2 
Although political scientists have long been interested in particular treaty regimes, including 
why states enter them and how they operate, they have not exploited treaty databases in 
order to reveal large-scale regularities in treatymaking. International law scholars have 
generally concerned themselves with the normative implications of treaty-making. Many 
believe that states should contribute to the development of international law by entering 
treaties, especially multilateral treaties (see, e.g., Blum 2006 for a discussion). But this 
scholarship proceeds largely without empirical evidence. 
This paper begins to fill the gap in our understanding of when treaty-making occurs 
and which forms it takes by providing a foundational set of facts. Drawing on a variety of 
sources, we develop a database of treaty-making since 1946. It includes the treaties each 
country has entered into, the dates of entry, the subject matter and form (e.g., bilateral or 
multilateral) of each treaty, dates of signature and ratification, reservations, and related data. 
In this paper, we explore the cross-sectional features of these data. Among other things, we 
document which countries and regions engage in the most treaty-making. We decompose 
treaty-making by subject area and form: bilateral and multilateral. We also consider which 
countries are most likely to lodge reservations against multilateral treaties. 
Our investigation is not purely descriptive, however. We make several predictions 
about the pattern of treaty-making and test these predictions. We argue that states enter 
treaties in order to obtain public goods, but that negotiating and enforcing treaties are 
costly—that is, they involve transaction costs. When a state decides whether to enter a treaty, 
it compares the benefit from the public good and the transaction costs. As the potential 
public goods increase, and as transaction costs decline, a state is more likely to enter a treaty, 
all else equal. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I presents our stylized conceptual framework 
and our basic empirical conjectures. Section II describes our data and its sources, and 
presents key summary statistics that reveal the basic patterns in treaty-making by geography 
and treaty subject. Sections III presents our empirical results, and Section IV offers our 
tentative conclusions and directions for future work. 
                                                 
2 Exceptions include Vreeland (2008) who studies why dictatorships join the Convention Against Torture. 
Also, the economics of trade literature examines the impact of trade treaties (e.g., Rose 2004; Von Stein 2005; 
Goldstein et al., 2007) and the determinants of trade policy (e.g., Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2003; Mansfield et 
al., 2002). There is also a related literature on the factors that determine whether states enter international 
organization (e.g., Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006). 
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I. Conceptual Framework: Public Goods and Transaction Costs 
 Public goods and state size. A standard prediction is that states enter into treaties to 
secure gains from cooperation. These gains typically take the form of public goods. We 
follow the familiar assumptions that the geographic boundaries of a state are fixed,3 and that 
one of the functions of a state is the provision of public or collective goods, such as internal 
policing, external defense, regulation of industry, enforcement of contracts and property 
rights, and the provision of a social safety net. A large state takes advantage of economies of 
scale, and so can provide large-scale public goods more cheaply than small states can. 
 The advantage of the treaty is that it allows governments to produce different public 
goods at different scales. Consider an example in which environmental quality and the size 
of economic markets are public goods. If environmental regulation is best performed at the 
state level, while the optimal size for economic markets would be at the two-state level, then 
the two states can remain separate, regulate the environment separately, and create a two-
state market through a trade treaty. When populations are heterogeneous, and so the optimal 
scale for most public goods is relatively low, smaller states can more effectively supply the 
low-scale public goods while using treaties to supply the higher-scale public goods. This logic 
implies that treaty-making and state size are substitutes, and thus that smaller states belong to 
more treaties than larger states do.4 Small states must enter treaties in order to produce the 
public goods that large states can produce internally.  
This prediction, that the number of states increases as the cost of treaty-making 
declines, has some support in recent history. Contemporaneous with the proliferation of 
treaties has been the fragmentation of states. In 1945, there were fewer than 80 states; today 
there are almost 200. Some scholars attribute the fragmentation of states to globalization. 
Alesina and Spolaore (2003) claim that a more benign international trade and security 
environment contributed to this trend.  
 Note, however, that the prediction is not as clear as it might first seem. First, the 
analysis in this paper examines a cross-section of countries, and we do not observe 
movements over time in the number of treaties, particularly movements in response to 
merger and break-up events.  If variations in the extensive margin of state sizes are not 
observed, it is unlikely that substitution effects can be detected. In addition to this 
observational difficulty, a new literature argues that large states have advantages in governing 
because the fixed costs of government can be spread across the larger population (Mulligan 
                                                 
3 Alesina and Spolaore (2003) and Spolaore and Warczaig (2005) present analyses in which borders are treated 
as endogenous, but they do not consider the possibility of treaties. 
4 This logic has a strong analogy to Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm. Treaty-making activity may be a rough 
proxy for cooperation between states, analogous to the choice of a firm to contract with other firms rather than 
expand by purchasing other firms or hiring employees. At the extreme, we could imagine thousands of states 
cooperating by treaty.  
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& Shleifer 2005). If this argument is correct, it may be that larger states will enter more 
treaties because treaty-making itself has high fixed costs, and larger states can spread this 
cost over a larger population. Larger states not only can maintain larger foreign ministries to 
negotiate and monitor treaties; they can also more effectively retaliate if treaty partners 
violate a treaty. According to this view, state size and treaty-making are complements.  
 Even if the larger countries do not have the advantage of lower fixed costs of treaty-
making, they may offer higher net benefits of scale with the result that they enter into more 
treaties. If small states gain more from entering treaties with larger states than with other 
small states, then large states could end up belonging to more treaties. Consider, for 
example, a large state L and three small states S1, S2, and S3. If each of the three small states 
seeks access to a larger economic market, and if the cost of concluding a treaty varies little 
with country size, then a treaty with L would promise the largest net benefits. A treaty with L 
would grant access to a larger market than a treaty with either of the smaller countries, and it 
would do so at roughly the same cost. Were each of the small states to pursue a treaty with 
the larger state, then L would belong to three treaties, while S1, S2, and S3 would each 
belong to only one treaty.5 This example produces two predictions: (1) larger states enter 
into more treaties; and (2) many treaties should arise between large states and small states, as 
well as between large states, and few treaties between small states. Thus, there are plausible 
reasons to expect the opposite of the Coasean prediction.  
 Other transaction costs measures. If states obtain benefits by entering treaties, they also 
face transaction costs. Treaties are highly costly both to negotiate and to enforce. 
Negotiation costs are familiar from the law and economics literature on contracts. Treaties, 
like contracts, describe the obligations of parties extending into the future. Because the 
future is difficult to predict, resources must be spent in anticipating possible contingencies 
that increase the cost or reduce the benefits of treaty compliance. For example, a trade treaty 
that reduces tariff barriers might create no problems today, when domestic producers who 
compete with imports are prosperous, but might create political problems in the future, if a 
recession throws these producers’ employees out of work. Adding detail to the treaty—such 
as conditional obligations—requires further effort. And, throughout, parties must bargain 
over how the surplus created by the treaty should be divided, which can give rise to bluffing, 
impasses, and other costs. 
 Enforcement costs are also significant. Each party must monitor the other in order 
to guard against treaty violations. Monitoring can be extremely difficult, and even after the 
violation is detected, the cost of enforcement is high. Because self-help is the only remedy, a 
state must deprive itself of the benefits of the cooperative relationship in order to sanction 
                                                 
5 Moreover, if larger states regularly engaged in more treaties than smaller states, the costs of establishing 
treaties may fall for large states. That is, there may be economies of scale in treaty-making, and if so, it provides 
another reason why larger countries may enter into more treaties.  
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the violator. Retaliation further interferes with the production of the public good in the short 
term.  
 Transaction costs are, of course, difficult to measure. We consider two measures: 
corruption level and age. We conjecture that non-corrupt governments will, all else equal, 
want to avoid entering treaties with corrupt governments. Corruption raises the cost of 
treaty-making in at least two ways. It may be necessary to make illicit payments in order to 
induce a corrupt government to agree to a treaty, and the costs of enforcing a treaty with a 
corrupt government may be higher given the danger that corrupt officials can be bribed to 
violate treaty obligations. This approach to reverses the causal direction of Sandholtz and 
Gray (2003), who argue that international integration reduces corruption. 
 With regard to a country’s age, older countries face lower transaction costs than 
newer countries do. Older countries, we conjecture, have more established customs, norms, 
and political institutions, which allow for smoother operation of the government, and hence 
cheaper negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement of treaties. Thus, older states may be 
party to more treaties than younger states are.  
 Types and Forms of Treaties. State size and transactions costs may influence the form of 
treaty-making in addition to the frequency of treaty-making. We distinguish three types of 
treaty-making: (1) bilateral treaties; (2) multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, which call “open” multilateral treaties or U.N. multilateral 
treaties; and (3) other multilateral treaties that are not deposited with the Secretary General, 
and which we call “closed” or non-U.N. multilateral treaties. Bilateral treaties are simply 
treaties between two states. Multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary General are 
treaties that have been sponsored by a United Nations organ such as the General Assembly 
or a UN regional commission. Under UN rules, these treaties are supposed to be of more 
general interest to the international community; they include the major human rights treaties, 
the Geneva Conventions, the Kyoto protocol, and the like.6 Generally, these treaties are 
open to all countries in the world, or to all countries in a particular region. Closed 
multilateral treaties reflect more parochial or regional concerns; these include trade 
agreements and military alliances. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States is an example of a closed multilateral treaty.  
 Each type of treaty presents a potentially different combination of costs and benefits 
to state. An analogy to standard-form contracts makes these differences apparent. Bilateral 
treaties and closed multilateral treaties are unlike standard-form contracts in that the 
particular parties negotiate them and tailor them to their specific needs. A plausible 
assumption is that negotiating and drafting bilateral treaties and closed multilateral treaties 
involve high transactions costs because of their specificity. In contrast, open multilateral 
                                                 
6 See United Nations 2006, § 2.3. 
  
7
treaties are closer to standard-form contracts. The transactions costs of negotiating open 
multilateral treaties may be high because more countries potentially participate in the 
drafting. But a goal of these treaties is often universal adoption, and once negotiated, the 
marginal cost of adding another member is low. Bilateral and closed multilateral treaties do 
not have do not have the same advantage of ex-post adjustments in participation. The 
marginal cost of a new partner to a bilateral or multilateral treaty is high because all 
participants must renegotiate the treaty.  
 States may enter open multilateral treaties subject to reservations that limit their 
obligations under these treaties. A plausible explanation for this practice is that reservations 
enable states to deviate from one-size-fits-all treaty obligations without obtaining advantages 
over non-reserving states, whose own obligations toward reserving states are reduced in 
reciprocal fashion (Parisi and Sevcenko 2002; Swaine 2006). States enter multilateral treaties 
in order to reduce the transaction costs of negotiating dozens of bilateral treaties, but the 
ability to reserve ensures that states whose interests are not adequately reflected in the treaty 
itself are not forced to an all-or-nothing choice between ratifying an unattractive treaty or 
opting out. International lawyers fear that this practice weakens international institutions and 
limits the development of international law, at least with respect to major standard-setting 
treaties such as human rights treaties.  
 Variation in the costs and benefits of treaty forms suggests that states’ preferred 
treaty forms will differ. States that enter into bilateral and closed multilateral treaties most 
often are apt to be those with the largest gains from and lowest costs to individualized 
contracting. Open multilateral treaties should not correlate with country size because their 
ambition of global membership minimizes the cost of adding additional members. But to the 
extent that reservations to open multilateral treaties are a form of individualized contracting 
or opting out, states with lower transactions costs and larger sizes may be more likely to 
lodge reservations.  
 In sum, we advance four main empirical predictions: 
● Larger states enter into more treaties. (A competing hypothesis is that 
larger states enter into fewer treaties).  
● States with lower transactions costs, as proxied by a more advanced age 
and a lower degree of corruption, enter into more treaties.  
● The frequency with which countries enter into U.N. treaties should not 
depend on a state’s size. 
● Smaller countries and countries with higher transactions costs should be 
less likely to enter into bilateral treaties or multilateral treaties outside of the 
U.N. framework. 
II. Data 
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A. Treaty Types 
 Sources of treaties. Our data set consists of treaties that states have entered since 1946. 
For bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties other than those sponsored by a United Nations 
organ, we rely on the Washington Treaty Index.7 The WTI database is more comprehensive 
than the United Nations Treaty Series, which other scholars have used. The UNTS consists 
of treaties that states have voluntarily registered with the UN Secretariat.8 The WTI consists 
of the UNTS treaties plus many thousands of treaties that states have not registered with the 
Secretariat. The superior comprehensiveness of the WTI is partly offset by the fact that data 
collection stopped in the 1990s, whereas the UNTS has been kept up to date. We use the 
WTI because even with these limitations it contains many thousands more treaties than the 
UNTS does. For multilateral treaties sponsored by a United Nations organ, we rely on the 
UN multilateral treaties database. This database is complete, and includes much useful 
information about reservations and other treaty actions as well. 
 Bilateral treaties can be decomposed by the type of treaty partner: those between two 
states, and those between a state and a multinational organization. Our bilateral data set 
consists of 38,186 bilateral treaties between states and 8,513 bilateral treaties between one 
state and an international organization. Our multilateral UN treaty data set consists of 667 
multilateral treaties. The average such treaty has about 32 parties. Our multilateral non-UN 
treaty data set consists of 6,258 treaties; the average such treaty has about 4 parties. 
 Omission of treaties and inclusion of void and minor treaties. States are legally obligated to 
register all treaties with the United Nations. Treaties that are not registered cannot be 
invoked before an organ of the United Nations. Nonetheless, it is clear that all states do not 
register all treaties (Blum 2006). States might refrain from submitting secret treaties or 
treaties that other states might object to; they might also simply neglect to submit treaties. 
The compilers of the WTI tried to adjust for this problem by soliciting unregistered treaties 
directly from governments; however, we do not know whether these efforts might have been 
affected by bias. We have found some anomalies by cross-checking registrations of parties to 
the same treaty. It appears that the countries with higher per capita income and more honest 
governments report more often. We can fix this problem to some extent but not completely. 
If the U.S. and Costa Rica are parties to a treaty that the U.S. registers but Costa Rica fails to 
register, we assume that the treaty is valid and both states are parties to it. But if two poor 
states both fail to register the treaty, our results will be biased. In addition, the UN data base 
counts an initial treaty ratified at time 1 and a mutual withdrawal at time 2 as two treaties 
rather than zero treaties, which is troublesome; more troublesome, treaties that have fallen 
into desuetude, minor treaties, and major treaties are all given equal weight. 
                                                 
7 See the World Treaty Index, http://db.lib.washington.edu/wti/wtdb.htm. See Pearson 2001. 
8 See United Nations Treaty Collection, http://untreaty.un.org/English/treaty.asp. See Kohona 2002.  
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 Omission of treaty-substitutes. The data set omits non-treaty agreements, which are often 
functionally similar or even identical to real treaties. Many such agreements are made 
between ministries or departments of governments of different states rather than officially 
by the governments themselves, but as far as we know they are no less likely to be complied 
with. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy lists dozens of agreements that it has 
made with similar ministries in more than fifty other states.9 These agreements might be 
appropriately counted as treaties for purpose of our analysis, but we have no way to find 
them systematically. However, we also have no reason to think that states’ official treaty-
making is unrepresentative of their lower-level agreements. 
 Quasi-states. Many treaties in the WTI and the UNTS data sets do not involve 
sovereign states but dependencies of states. We exclude these treaties from our regressions. 
 New, old, and successor states. When a state divides, typically but not always one of the 
new states can be identified as the continuing version of the old state, while the other states 
are treated as originating with the division. The old state’s treaties are mainly allocated to the 
continuing state, but they might also be inherited by the others. For example, Russia 
inherited the treaties of the Soviet Union; Kazakhstan did not. In some cases, as when 
Czechoslovakia divided into the Czech and Slovak republics, the treaties must be allocated 
on an ad hoc basis. This point is of importance when trying to determine the age of states in 
our data set, and we use various methods for handling these problems (including running 
regressions with and without the problematic states). 
 Timing. Our cross-sectional dataset reflects social, economic, and demographic 
information on states from approximately 1980 to 2000. Because between-state variation is 
much greater than longitudinal, within-state variation during this period, we do not think it 
matters that all of the information is not from the same year. States that came into this 
existence during this period were dropped from the regressions. 
B. Summary Statistics on Treaties 
Geography. Table 1.A presents averages for the number of treaties states joined and 
the level of membership in those treaties. The averages are taken across continents to 
provide insight into the geographic distribution of treaties.10  
                                                 
9 U.S. Department of Energy, Bilateral International Agreements, https://ostiweb.osti.gov/iaem/country-
frame_bi.html. 
10 Note that the method of calculation implies the double-counting of bilateral treaties between states. If 
Canada has a treaty with Tanzania, the treaty enters the data twice—once as a Canadian treaty and a second 
time as a Tanzanian treaty. For bilateral treaties between a state and a non-state organization, there is no double 
counting. Averages are taken across continents, and non-state organizations are not coded as having any 
particular geography. When averages area taken across continents, the organization’s tallies are therefore 
excluded from the calculations. 
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 Column (1) shows the average number of bilateral treaties countries have ratified. 
The magnitude of the variation across continents is enormous. The average for North 
America is more than ten times that of Africa. The North American average is driven by the 
United States, which is party to 7,181 bilateral treaties;. The next most active nation, France, 
is party to 3,707 bilateral treaties. The third most active, Spain, is party to 2,527 bilateral 
treaties, and China is the fourth most active with 2,490 bilateral treaties.  North America has 
nearly five times the average number of bilateral treaties with states as the second-ranked 
continent (Europe). The average state has entered 463 bilateral treaties. 
 Column (2) reports similar averages for bilateral treaties between states and 
organizations. Again, North America has the highest average. The level of these averages is 
much lower than those in column (1), which indicates that treaties between a state and an 
organization are less frequent than treaties between two states. The difference is particularly 
striking in continents with mostly developed countries. In North America, the values in 
columns (1) and (2) differ by almost an order of magnitude, and in Europe, the average 
number of bilateral treaties with non-state partners is about 11% of the average number of 
bilateral treaties with state partners. Among the developing world, the gap is not quite as 
large. For example, in Africa, the average number of bilateral treaties with non-state partners 
is about half of the average number of bilateral treaties with state partners. This is consistent 
with the larger role international organizations play in developing economies. 
Column (3) shows the number of “closed” or non-UN multilateral treaties joined by 
the average state, or the number of such multilateral treaties that a state has ratified. Column 
(4) reports the average number of partners belong to the non-UN multilateral treaties that 
states in a given continent join. For example, imagine that every state on continent X 
belonged to two non-UN multilateral treaties, one of which had 50 members and the other 
had 100 members. In this instance, the average number of treaty partners states on continent 
X would have for the UN multilateral treaties which they joined would be 75. This measure 
gives an indication of whether states are joining non-UN multilateral treaties that many other 
states are joining.  
As with bilateral treaties, North America – and specifically the United States – 
dominates the number of closed multilateral treaties joined. Europe is not far behind with 
568 closed multilateral treaties joined on average, and again, African countries belong to 
relatively few closed multilateral treaties. In addition, the number of closed multilateral 
treaties joined appears inversely related to the average membership in the closed multilateral 
treaties joined. For example, comparing columns (3) and (4), African countries join on 
average fewer non-UN multilateral treaties (171 versus 327 for all countries). But the non-
UN treaties which African countries join tend to be the treaties with the widest 
subscriptions. The treaties that Latin American countries join have on average 50 other 
countries as members, compared with 39 for all countries. Europe and North America 
  
11
exhibit the opposite pattern. Countries on these continents join on average more non-UN 
multilateral treaties (569 and 672, respectively), and on average, the non-UN treaties 
European countries join tend to have fewer participants (30 for both). States that join few 
closed multilateral treaties appear to join the more popular or more widely subscribed 
multilateral treaties, while states that join many closed multilateral treaties appear to join 
some less popular or less widely subscribed multilateral treaties. 
Columns (5) and (6) repeat the exercise for closed or non-UN multilateral treaties. 
Just as with closed multilateral treaties, an inverse relationship between number of treaties 
joined and average treaty membership emerges among open multilateral treaties. States in 
North America and Europe join the most open multilateral treaties but these treaties have a 
smaller number of members on average. In contrast, states in Africa join relatively few open 
multilateral treaties, but these treaties have relatively high average membership. Asian 
countries are outliers in this pattern; they join relatively few closed multilateral treaties and 
these treaties have a low average membership. 
But the averages for non-UN multilateral treaties contrast with the averages for UN 
treaties in three ways. First, the variation is much less than that of bilateral treaties. The 
averages range from a high of 173 in Europe to a low of 84 in Latin America. The more 
modest geographic variation in open multilateral treaties is likely due to the fact that there is 
a limited number of UN multilateral treaties available for states to join while the number of 
bilateral and closed multilateral arrangements states may concoct among themselves is 
potentially infinite. Second, the average number of non-UN multilateral treaties joined is, on 
most continents, roughly double that of the UN multilateral treaties joined. Third, the 
average number of members to the non-UN multilateral treaties is between a half to a third 
of the average for UN treaties. States tend to belong to more closed multilateral treaties than 
open multilateral treaties, but each closed multilateral treaty has on average fewer members 
than open multilateral treaties do.  
 The last two columns of Panel A consider the frequency with which states advance 
reservations against UN treaties. Column (7) shows that the average number of UN 
multilateral treaties that states on each continent have joined with reservations. The global 
average is 25 relative to an average 114 UN treaties joined, or about 22% of the average 
number of UN treaties joined. Countries in Europe and Latin America are the outliers. 
European countries lodge reservations to an average of 36 of the multilateral treaties it joins, 
while the average Latin American country does so to only 19 multilateral treaties. In 
percentage terms, the average European country issues reservations in 44% of the 
multilateral treaties it joins, and the average Latin American country issues reservations in 
only 17%. 
 The final column of Panel A displays the average number of partners in the 
multilateral UN treaties that are ratified with reservations. For every continental average, the 
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treaties against which countries advance reservations have more members than the 
multilateral treaties that garner no reservations. Treaties for which a country issues a 
reservation have on average fifteen more member countries than the average of all 
multilateral treaties the country joins. This difference is consistent with the view that the 
ability to lodge a reservation makes a treaty acceptable to a larger number of states.  
 Treaty subjects. Panel B of Table 1 displays average characteristics of treaties by their 
subject area. The unit of analysis here is a treaty, unlike in Panel A where it was countries. 
The columns report the number of treaties, with the exception of column (4) which reports 
the average number of member states per treaty.   
  Columns (1) through (3) show that despite the considerable attention that treaties on 
human rights, refugees, and cultural issues receive, they comprise an exceedingly small share 
of the total number of treaties. This pattern persists across the types of treaty forms – 
bilateral between states, bilateral between a state and a non-state entity, and closed 
multilateral. Instead, the three types of treaties that we classify as “economic” – international 
trade and development, transportation and communication, and fiscal matters – collectively 
represent the most common subject of a treaty. Economic treaties comprise a majority of 
bilateral treaties, irrespective of whether the partner is a state or non-state entity, and also a 
majority of closed multilateral treaties. Trade treaties, a subcategory of economic treaties, 
account for a plurality of bilateral treaties between states and of closed multilateral treaties. 
They constitute a majority of bilateral treaties with non-state entities, which is consistent 
with many of these treaties involving trade associations and development organizations. 
 In terms of their membership, closed multilateral treaties have relatively modest 
memberships. The average number of states joining each closed multilateral treaty is four, 
and the average varies little by subject matter.  
 The remaining columns of Panel B turn attention to the subjects of UN multilateral 
treaties. The number of such treaties (667) is about a tenth the number of closed multilateral 
treaties (6,258), and it is about a fiftieth the number of bilateral treaties (38,186). Again, the 
share of UN treaties pertaining to high-salience issues, such as human rights, refugees, and 
education and culture, is quite small. Economic treaties account for 32% of UN multilateral 
treaties, but unlike bilateral and closed multilateral arrangements, UN multilateral treaties 
rarely address the issues of trade and development. Instead, most of the economic UN 
multilateral treaties address issues of transportation and communication. Also, UN 
multilateral treaties address a wider diversity of topics. More than half of the UN treaties 
were so difficult to classify that we placed them in the catchall category of “other.”  
 Regarding membership in UN multilateral treaties, column (6) shows that economic 
treaties have been ratified by roughly the same average number of countries – about 30 – as 
other types of treaties. An exception is the economic subcategory trade and development 
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which has only 23 members on average. Some of the non-economic categories, such as the 
treaties pertaining to refugees and civil and criminal litigation, have a higher average number 
of members. 
 The final two columns of Panel B address the relationship between reservations in 
UN multilateral treaties and their subject areas. Column (7)shows that the incidence of 
reservations to economic treaties is approximately the same as it is among all multilateral 
treaties on deposit with the United Nations. That rate is about 13%. The rate is considerably 
higher among some of the non-economic categories. Over 50% of treaties governing civil 
and criminal litigation have at least one member country that has lodged a reservation, and 
the rate is 40% or more for treaties governing refugees, and education and cultural matters.  
 The final column of the panel shows that multilateral treaties receiving at least one 
reservation have a higher average membership than other multilateral treaties. Overall, these 
treaties have on average twenty more member countries than the average membership of all 
multilateral treaties. For treaties in some of the non-economic categories, the gap is even 
larger. The membership of diplomatic and consular treaties, human rights treaties, and 
refugee treaties is more than double when those treaties have received at least one 
reservation. 
III. Regression Analysis  
 To control for the multiple factors potentially influencing treaty-making, we analyze 
the data with cross-sectional regressions of the form  
Yi = Piα + Xiβ + εi,  
where Yi is a measure of treaties into which state i has entered. Typically, Yi is the number of 
treaties of a particular type that country i has entered, or the fraction of treaties that country i 
with a particular characteristic has entered.11 Pi is the population of state i, Xi is a vector of 
other independent variables for state i, and εi is an error term. The independent variables 
include (logs) of population and real GDP per capita. Ethnolinguistic diversity measures the 
heterogeneity of a population along ethnic and linguistic lines: a higher measure means 
greater diversity. Consistent with our discussion of transactions costs, we include an index of 
corruption perception and the (log of a) state’s age. The corruption perception index reflects 
the degree of corruption: a lower score indicates greater corruption. The number of contiguous 
countries are included as a control variable because it seems likely that a state will have more 
treaties if it has more neighbors. In view of the legal origins literature (La Porta, et al. 1998), 
                                                 
11 For regressions on the number of treaties, the dependent variables are effectively count data. For that reason, 
we also estimated Poisson regressions, and the results were qualitatively similar. For the sake of simplicity in 
this exploratory analysis, only OLS estimates are reported here. 
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we include indicators for common law, religious law, and civil law (which is omitted from 
the regressions as it provides the baseline). Continent dummies are also included.12 
 All Treaties and Bilateral Treaties. Panel A of Table 2 reports OLS estimates on all 
treaties and bilateral treaties. Column (1) reports the relationship between state 
characteristics and the (log of the) number of treaties of any type that the state has ratified, 
and column (2) conducts a similar exercise for the (log of) bilateral treaties. Both population 
and per-capita income correlate strongly with the number of treaties of any type and the 
number of bilateral treaties a state enters. The number of bilateral treaties and treaties of all 
types also rise with the age of a state and the honesty of its government (i.e., as corruption 
declines). These estimates are consistent with the “demand-side” predictions that larger 
states and states with lower transactions costs will enter into more treaties. First, less corrupt 
countries are more desirable trading partners, because contract formation and enforcement 
is less costly with more honest partners. Illicit side payments are less necessary and cheating 
on economic bargains are less frequent where corruption is less prevalent. Second, countries 
with large internal markets are desirable trading partners for smaller countries whose own 
domestic markets have more modest scale. Relationships between treaty-making and the 
other explanatory variables are weaker. The number of contiguous states appears unrelated 
to the number of treaties joined. The degree of ethnolinguistic diversity in a state and its 
possessing a legal origin other than the civil law have positive associations with the total 
number of treaties entered. But these correlations are not statistically significant.  
 
 These results show that larger and richer countries enter into more treaties of all 
sorts as well as into more treaties in bilateral form. But does bilateral treaty-making account 
for a larger share of such states’ treaties? To assess this possibility, the dependent variable in 
the regression reported in column (3) is the fraction of a state’s treaties that are bilateral. The 
United States is an outlier according to this measure as well. Forty-five percent of the 
average country’s treaties are bilateral, but 87% of the United States’ treaties are bilateral. 
The strongest correlates of a higher share of bilateral treaties are the size of a country’s 
population and its age. These estimates imply that as a state’s population size grows and as it 
ages, it will enter into more treaties of all types but will enter into disproportionately more 
bilateral treaties. Other characteristics do not show statistically significant relationships with 
the percentage of bilateral treaties. For example, while richer states enter into more treaties, 
they appear to enter into more treaties of all types; the fraction of bilateral treaties does not 
rise substantially as a state becomes wealthier. These results provide a partial confirmation of 
the prediction about state size, transactions costs, and the choice of treaty form.  
                                                 
12 For our dependent variable, we use the total number of treaties states had joined by 2000. The population 
and real GDP per capita data are the averages of 1980 and 2000. Because most of the variation in the data are 
cross-sectional, the specific years that we use do not matter. In alternative specifications, we add year fixed 
effects, which do not have a significant impact on our results. We also control for the stock of treaties, which 
also do not have a significant impact on our results. 
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The United States is an outlier with extraordinary number of treaties, and for that 
reason, the regressions in the last three columns repeat those in the first three but exclude 
the United States. (Panels B and C, discussed below, also probe the robustness of the 
estimates to the exclusion of the United States.) These results show that none of the 
conclusions hinge on the United States.  
 
 Multilateral Treaties. Panel B of Table 2 turns attention to multilateral treaty-making. 
In the regression in column (1), the dependent variable is the (log of the) number of open or 
UN multilateral treaties a state has entered, and in column (2), it is the (log of the) number of 
closed or non-UN multilateral treaties a state has entered. Both types of multilateral treaty-
making feature a strong positive correlation with a state’s income level. But other state 
characteristics exhibit sharply different relationships with the two forms of multilateral 
treaties.  
 
 With the exception of income level, none of the observed characteristics of a state 
correlate significantly with the number of UN multilateral treaties it joins. Particularly 
striking in view of its strong relationship with other forms of treaty-making is the lack of a 
correlation between population size and UN multilateral treaties. Although too much 
importance should not be attached to R-squares, it is striking that the explanatory variables 
account for a much smaller proportion of the variation in the number of UN treaties a state 
joins than that of the other types of treaties joined. The absence of other strong correlations 
here should perhaps not be surprising because multilateral treaties deposited at the UN 
generally open their membership to all countries. This openness may result in a diverse set of 
countries joining, in which case membership is unlikely to be associated with any particular 
state characteristics. In addition, multilateral treaties are vulnerable to free-riding, so they 
may not be as effective as bilateral treaties at generating cooperative surpluses; however, they 
might solve coordination problems. The evidence for compliance with one type of 
multilateral treaty—the human rights treaty—is mixed (compare Hathaway 2002, Neumayer 
2007, Simmons 2006), but then the question arises why states would enter multilateral 
treaties if they expected each other to free ride. If multilateral treaties are less important, or 
mainly symbolic, they are not likely to be correlated with country characteristics. 
 
Results from an examination of the fraction of multilateral treaties that are closed 
confirm these patterns. Column (3) shows estimates from a regression on this variable. 
Larger states, older states, and states with less corrupt governments have a higher share of 
their multilateral treaties in closed form. The number of contiguous states correlates with a 
lower incidence of non-UN multilateral treaty-making. Per-capita income does not correlate 
with a higher share of non-UN multilateral treaties. A state’s participation in both UN and 
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non-UN multilateral treaties rises with its income level, and the rise appears proportional 
across the two forms of multilateral treaties.  
 
Again, the United States’ treaty-making is atypical along these dimensions. The 
average state makes 65% of its multilateral treaties outside of the UN or in closed form, 
while for the United States, this figure is 91%. But the estimates from the remaining columns 
of Panel B confirm that these patterns are not driven by the United States’ unusual treaty-
making practices.  
 
 Reservations to UN Multilateral Treaties. Panel C of Table 2 reports regressions in which 
the number of reservations advanced in UN multilateral treaties and the fraction of such 
treaties joined with reservations are the dependent variables. When a state joins a multilateral 
treaty subject to a reservation, it limits its obligations under the treaty. The perspective 
developed here suggests that larger states might have more reservations than smaller states 
because larger states gain less from multilateral treaties than smaller states do, given that 
larger states are in a better position to produce public goods internally. Large states might 
enter into more multilateral treaties because they have more treaty-making capacity, and the 
additional reservations might reflect the fact that they are outvoted by more numerous small 
countries on particular treaty issues during treaty negotiations. 
 
 The estimates in Panel C fail to support these hypotheses. The size of a state’s 
population does not correlate with the number of reservations or the incidence of 
reservations among the UN treaties joined. With the possible exception of a state’s income 
level, which correlates weakly with the number of reservations, none of the observed state 
characteristics exhibits a close relationship with reservations.  
 
 In the only statistical study of reservations—a study limited to the six major human 
rights treaties—Neumayer (2007) finds that liberal democracies that join human rights 
treaties issue reservations more frequently than nondemocracies do. Together with evidence 
that liberal democracies have better human rights records, Neumayer’s results suggest that 
liberal democracies issue reservations because they take their treaty obligations more 
seriously than nondemocracies do (see Goldsmith and Posner 2005). In results not reported 
here in order to conserve space, we tested this hypothesis using our data set and adding the 
Polity IV variable for liberal rights. We found, consistent with Neumayer’s results, that more 
liberal states were more likely to issue at least one reservation conditional on entering a 
multilateral treaty (at the 10% level); however, liberal states were no less likely to enter 
multilateral treaties. These results suggest either that treaties are more likely to reflect the 
interests of authoritarian states than those of liberal states, so that liberal states need to use 
reservations to adjust their obligations; or that treaties are taken more seriously by liberal 
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states, and they enter reservations because otherwise governments cannot simply order 
courts to ignore treaty obligations. 
 
 Columns (3) and (4) repeat the exercise excluding the United States, and the 
estimates are almost unchanged. Moreover, with regard to reservations, the United States is 
not an outlier. The average country lodges reservations in 24% of the UN treaties it joins, 
and the United States does so in 21%.  
 
 Economic Treaties. Panel D provides an initial view of the variation in treaty-making 
patterns by treaty subject matter. It presents estimates from regressions in which the 
dependent variables are the percentage of treaties that pertain to economic subjects. Column 
(1) presents estimates for the share of all treaties that pertain to economic topics, and the 
remaining columns consider the incidence of this subject within each of the three major 
treaty forms. The regression in column (1) shows that more populous, less corrupt, older, 
and lower income countries have a higher fraction of their treaties relating to economic 
issues.  
 
 The remaining columns show that population correlates with the frequency of 
economic treaty-making irrespective of the form of the treaty. The share of bilateral and 
non-UN multilateral treaties that address economic issues rises sharply with a state’s 
population. While it is not statistically significant, the sign and magnitude of the point 
estimate implies that this pattern persists in UN multilateral treaty-making as well.  
 
 The negative relationship between the share of economic treaty-making and a state’s 
income level arises almost exclusively from bilateral treaties. This estimate is consistent with 
the idea that wealthier countries may have less need to enter into economic bilateral treaties 
because they have already achieved a high degree of economic success and thus focus their 
bilateral treaty-making on other topics. As seen in previous tables, wealthier countries enter 
into more treaties – of all types – than poorer countries. But the fraction of treaties that 
pertain to non-economic subjects expands more rapidly as a state’s income rises. Thus, while 
richer countries have more economic bilateral treaties, they account for a smaller share of 
their bilateral treaty-making.  
 
 Another feature of economic treaty-making that appears due to almost entirely 
economic treaty-making in the bilateral context is the correlation with corruption. More 
honest governments have a high fraction of bilateral treaties pertaining to economic issues.  
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
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 The empirical regularities of treaty-making – such as which states enter into treaties 
most often and which forms the treaties take – are poorly understood. This absence of 
research on treaty-making is surprising given the central role of treaties in international 
relations. This paper takes a first step at filling in this gap by generating a set of simple 
predictions about treaty-making and testing those predictions against a data set of every 
bilateral and multilateral treaty recorded since 1946. We find patterns of treaty-making 
largely consistent with these predictions. Larger and wealthier states should benefit more 
from cooperation, and should afford the costs of tailoring treaties to specific partners. These 
states enter into more treaties and enter into more bilateral and closed multilateral treaties, 
and in particular, larger states are more likely to enter bilateral and closed multilateral treaties 
that pertain to economic matters. Older and less corrupt states should be more reliable treaty 
partners, and they enter into more bilateral treaties and “closed” multilateral treaties. 
Membership in treaties sponsored by the United Nations does not correlate with country 
size, which is consistent with the U.N.’s goal of widespread participation, and low per-
country transaction costs in negotiating these treaties. 
 
  
19
References 
 
Alesina, Alberto, and Enrico Spolaore. 2003. The Size of Nations. 
 
Blum, Gabriella. 2006. Does International Law Need More Universal Law? A Multifaceted 
Approach to Multilateralism and Bilateralism in International Treaty-Making, Draft. 
 
Coase, Ronald H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm, Economica, 4: 386-405. 
 
Dreher, Axel. 2006. Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of 
Globalization, Applied Economics, 38: 1091. 
 
Elkins, Zachary, Andrew Guzman, & Beth Simmons. 2006. Competing for Capital: the 
Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, International Organization. 
 
Frey, Bruno, and Eichenberger, Reiner. 2004. The New Democratic Federalism for Europe: 
Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions. 
 
Gamble, John King. 1980. Reservations To Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of 
State Practice, American Journal of International Law, 74: 372. 
 
Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. 
Do Institutions Cause Growth?, Journal of Economic Growth, 9:271-303. 
 
Goldsmith, Jack L., and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005). 
 
Goldstein, Judith, Doug Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. Institutions and International 
Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade, 
International Organization, 61: 37. 
 
Hathaway, Oona. 2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, Yale Law Journal, 
111: 1935. 
 
Kohona, Palitha T.B. 2002. The United Nations Treaty Collection on the Internet--
Developments and Challenges, International Journal of Legal Information 30: 397. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. 1998. 
Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 106(6):1113-55. 
 
  
20
Mansfield, Edward D. and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2006. Democratization and International 
Organizations, International Organization, 60(1): 137-67.  
 
Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. Why Democracies 
Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements, International 
Organization, 57(3):477-513. 
 
Mansfield, Edward D. and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: 
The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Agreements, 
International Organization, 57(4):829-62. 
 
Mulligan, Casey B., and Andrei Shleifer. 2005. The Extent of the Market and the Supply of 
Regulation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120: 1445. 
 
Neumayer, Eric. 2005. Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for 
Human Rights?, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49: 925. 
 
Neumayer, Eric. 2007. Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations To International 
Human Rights Treaties, Journal of Legal Studies, forthcoming. 
 
Parisi, Francesco, and Catherine Sevcenko. 2002. Treaty Reservations and the Economics of 
Article 21(i) of the Vienna Convention, 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law, 21: 1. 
 
Pearson, Glenda J. 2001. Rohn’s World Treaty Index: Its Past and Future, International 
Journal of Legal Information, 29: 543. 
 
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. Institutions Rule: The 
Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, Journal 
of Economic Growth, 9:131-65. 
  
Rose, Andrew K. 2004. Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?, American 
Economic Review, 94: 98. 
 
Sandholtz, Wayne and Mark M. Gray. 2003. International Integration and National 
Corruption, International Organization, 57(4):761-800. 
 
Simmons, Beth. 2006. International Human Rights: Law, Politics and Accountability. Draft. 
 
Spolaore, Enrico and Romain Wacziarg. 2005. Borders and Growth, Journal of Economic 
Growth, 10:331-86. 
  
21
 
Swaine, Edward T. 2006. Reserving, Yale Journal of International Law, 31: 307. 
 
United Nations, Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty Section. 2006. Treaty Handbook. Available 
at: http://untreaty.un.org/English/TreatyHandbook/hbframeset.htm. 
 
Von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do Treaties Constrain or Screen? Selection Bias and Treaty 
Compliance, American Political Science Review, 99(4):611-22. 
 
Vreeland, James Raymond. 2008. Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why 
Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture, International 
Organization, 62(1):65-101 
  
22
Appendix: Variable Definitions and Sources 
All treaties. Sum of the number of bilateral and multilateral treaties a country has joined since 1946. Authors’ 
calculation from the number of bilateral and multilateral treaties. 
 
Bilateral treaties. Tallies of the number of bilateral treaties ratified by each state since 1946. Authors’ 
tabulations from the Washington Treaty Index, http://db.lib.washington.edu/wti/wtbd.htm. See Section II for 
a complete description of how these tabulations were made. 
 
Multilateral treaties. Tallies of countries’ ratification of each multilateral treaties on deposit with the United 
Nations since 1946. Authors’ tabulations from the United Nations Treaty Collection, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/treaty.asp. See Section II for a complete description of how these tabulations 
were made. 
 
Non-UN multilateral treaties. Tallies of the number of bilateral treaties ratified by each state since 1946. 
Authors’ tabulations from the Washington Treaty Index, http://db.lib.washington.edu/wti/wtbd.htm. See 
Section II for a complete description of how these tabulations were made. 
 
Economic and non-economic treaties. The authors coded both bilateral and multilateral treaties according 
to the 35 United Nations treaty subject categories on the basis of each treaty’s title. Treaties pertaining to (1) 
trade and development; (2) transportation and communication; and (3) fiscal matters were grouped as 
economic, and the remaining 32 categories were grouped as noneconomic.  
 
Population. Natural logarithm of the country’s average population between 1980 and 2000. Authors’ 
calculations of data from Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, 
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
September 2006, available at http:pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.  
 
Real GDP per capita. Natural logarithm of the country’s average real gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita between 1980 and 2000. The data are deflated to a base year of 1996 using a Laspeyres index. Authors’ 
calculations of data from Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, 
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
September 2006, available at http:pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. 
 
Growth rate of real GDP per capita. Change in natural logarithm of a country’s average real GDP per capita 
from 1980 to 2000. Authors’ calculations of data from Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn 
World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the 
University of Pennsylvania, September 2006, available at http:pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. 
 
Government Inefficiency. Average ratio of government expenditures to gross domestic product between 
1980 and 2000. Authors’ calculations of data from Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn 
World Table Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the 
University of Pennsylvania, September 2006, available at http:pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. 
 
Ethnolinguistic diversity. An index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization with values between 0 and 1. Higher 
values indicate a higher degree of fractionalization. The data source is Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeshauwer, 
William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg, 2003, “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth 
8(2): 155-94 (June); available at http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/downloads/fractionalization.xls. 
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Corruption perception index. A composite index measuring the degree of perceived corruption in a country. 
It takes values between 1 and 7, with higher values indicating a more transparency and less corruption. The 
values for 2006 are used. The data source is Internet Center for Corruption Research. The data are available at 
http://www.iccg.org/downloads/CPI_2006.xls. 
 
Number of contiguous states The sum of the number of states with contiguous borders. Data source: 
Central Intelligence Agency, 2006, CIA World Factbook Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
Available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/download.htm. 
 
Age of the country The number of years since a country’s independence. This figure is capped at 350 years. 
Authors’ calculations from Central Intelligence Agency, 2006, CIA World Factbook Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office. Available at https://www.cia.gov/cia/download.htm. 
 
Degree of political rights. These data are taken from Center for International Development and Conflict 
Management, Polity IV Project, available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/. 
 
Common or religious law country. These classifications are taken from the classification of the Faculty of 
Law, Civil Law Section, University of Ottawa, available at http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/world-legal-
systems/eng-monde.php. 
 
Degree of political globalization. This measure is the KOF Index of Political Globalization. The source is 
Dreher (2006), available at http://www.kof.ch/globalization/. 
 
Democracy. From Polity IV. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Treaties (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
A. By Continent 
 
 
 
Continent 
Average Number of 
State Partners in 
Bilateral Treaties per 
State 
(1) 
Average Number of 
Non-State Partners in 
Bilateral Treaties per 
State 
(2) 
Average Number of 
non-UN Multilateral 
Treaties Joined per 
State 
(3) 
Average Number of 
Members per non-UN 
Multilateral Treaty 
(4) 
Africa 211.54 
(22.39) 
100.00 
(11.06) 
171.74 
(16.77) 
49.71 
(1.62) 
Asia (excluding 
Southeast Asia) 
586.78 
(312.43) 
109.56 
(58.63) 
174.67 
(71.58) 
25.90 
(3.15) 
Southeast Asia 693.42 
(138.92) 
218.25 
(49.01) 
290.80 
(32.40) 
41.65 
(1.11) 
Latin America  368.17 
(78.26) 
93.83 
(16.55) 
236.12 
(23.80) 
43.32 
(1.83) 
North America 3,210.33 
(1,985.90) 
354.00 
(119.54) 
672.33 
(159.90) 
30.15 
(4.98) 
Europe 770.94 
(147.62) 
86.68 
(16.22) 
568.55 
(83.18) 
30.01 
(1.46) 
Mideast 592.43 
(79.16) 
137.14 
(21.95) 
256.13 
(49.79) 
38.72 
(2.88) 
World 462.96 
(72.55) 
116.30 
(10.66) 
326.59 
(28.34) 
39.30 
(1.08) 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Treaties (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
A. By Continent (cont.) 
 
 
 
Continent 
Average Number of 
UN Treaties Joined per 
State 
(5) 
Average Number of 
Treaty Partners per 
UN Treaty Joined 
(6) 
Average Number of 
UN Treaties Joined 
with Reservations per 
State 
(7) 
Average Number of 
Treaty Partners per 
UN Treaty Joined with 
Reservations 
(8) 
Africa 90.36 
(8.64) 
112.22 
(3.65) 
20.43 
(1.63) 
128.70 
(3.96) 
Asia (excluding 
Southeast Asia) 
84.67 
(7.98) 
108.40 
(3.85) 
21.67 
(1.5) 
118.63 
(4.37) 
Southeast Asia 110.92 
(9.07) 
101.67 
(4.25) 
22.92 
(1.42) 
117.55 
(4.16) 
Latin America  83.92 
(3.96) 
114.46 
(1.96) 
19.42 
(.76) 
132.39 
(2.38) 
North America 113.00 
(8.96) 
98.81 
(2.99) 
26.33 
(3.18) 
110.84 
(4.63) 
Europe 172.90 
(11.43) 
82.45 
(3.30) 
36.45 
(2.23) 
95.54 
(4.16) 
Mideast 104.43 
(13.18) 
102.83 
(6.19) 
23.43 
(1.91) 
116.22 
(3.93) 
World 113.76 
(5.26) 
102.58 
(1.89) 
25.12 
(1.00) 
117.64 
(2.14) 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Treaties 
B. By Subject Matter of Treaty (Means and in Parentheses Standard Errors, unless otherwise specified) 
 
 
Selected Treaty Subject 
Matters 
Bilateral Treaties 
between States: 
Number and 
Percentage of 
Total 
(1) 
Bilateral Treaties 
between State and 
Non-State Entity: 
Number and 
Percentage of 
Total 
(2) 
Number of non-
UN Multilateral 
Treaties: Number 
and Percentage of 
Total 
(3) 
Average Number 
of Members per 
non-UN 
Multilateral Treaty 
(4) 
Diplomatic & Consular 
Relations 
2,480 (6.8%) 449 (5.3%) 266 (4.25%) 3.6 (0.4) 
Human Rights 7 (0.0%) 23 (0.3%) 107 (1.71%) 9.5 (1.8) 
Refugees 19 (0.0%) 8 (0.1%) 72 (1.15%) 4.3 (0.8) 
Education & Culture 3,259 (8.5%) 336 (3.9%) 229 ( 3.66%) 2.6 (0.3) 
Civil & Criminal 
Litigation 
848 (2.2%) 96 (1.1%) 167 (2.67%) 2.1 (0.3) 
Economic: 21,935 (57.4%) 6,198 (72.8%) 3,156 (50.4%) 4.2 (0.2) 
(1) International Trade & 
Development 
12,946 (33.9%) 5,373 (63.1%) 2,189 (34.98%) 3.7 (0.2) 
(2) Transportation & 
Communication 
4,022 (10.5%) 303 (3.6%) 597 (9.54%) 6.0 (0.5) 
(3) Fiscal Matters 4,967 (13.0%) 522 (6.1%) 370 (5.91%) 3.8 (0.5) 
All Other Categories 9,640 (25.0%) 1,405 (16.5%) 2,261 (36.13%) 4.4 (0.3) 
Total 38,186 (100.0%) 8,513 (100.0%) 6,258 (100%) 4.2 (.03) 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics on Treaties (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
B. By Subject Matter of Treaty (Means and in Parentheses Standard Errors, unless otherwise specified) (cont.) 
 
 
Selected Treaty Subject 
Matters 
Number of UN 
Multilateral 
Treaties: Number 
and Percentage of 
Total 
(5) 
Average Number 
of Members per 
UN Multilateral 
Treaty 
(6) 
Fraction of UN 
Multilateral 
Treaties Where a 
State Joined with 
Reservations 
(7) 
 
Average Number 
of Members per 
UN Multilateral 
Treaty Having 
Reservations 
 (8) 
Diplomatic & Consular 
Relations 
31 (4.6%) 43.9 
(10.7) 
.129 
(.061) 
91.5 
(41.9) 
Human Rights 19 (2.8%) 28.7 
(12.0) 
.368 
(.114) 
74.1 
(25.2) 
Refugees 5 (2.8%) 62.2 
(30.3) 
.400 
(.245) 
123.0 
(42.0) 
Education & Culture 9 (0.7%) 34.9 
(18.7) 
.444 
(.176) 
70.0 
(36.0) 
Civil & Criminal 
Litigation 
16 (2.4%) 44.4 
(16.8) 
.563 
(.128) 
60.4 
(23.7) 
Economic: 212 (31.8%) 30.0 
(3.0) 
.127 
(.023) 
49.9 
(10.3) 
(1) International Trade & 
Development 
20 (3.0%) 22.9 
(9.0) 
.200 
(.092) 
68.3 
(35.6) 
(2) Transportation & 
Communication 
190 (28.5%) 31.0 
(3.2) 
.121 
(.024) 
46.3 
(10.7) 
(3) Fiscal Matters 2 (0.3%)  
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
All Other Categories 375 (56.2%) 31.5 
(2.2) 
.101 
(.016) 
37.1 
(6.9) 
Total 667 (100.0%) 32.1 
(1.7) 
.136 
(.013) 
51.7 
(5.8) 
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Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions: Treaties as a Function of Country Characteristics 
A. Total Treaties and Bilateral Treaties 
 
Log All 
Treaties 
(1) 
Log Bilateral 
Treaties 
(2) 
% of Treaties 
are Bilateral 
(3) 
Log Bilateral 
Treaties 
(4) 
Log Bilateral 
Treaties 
(5) 
% of Treaties 
are Bilateral 
(6) 
Log Population .290*** 
(.044) 
.436*** 
(.074) 
5.273** 
(1.340) 
.282** 
(.046) 
.427** 
(.074) 
5.273** 
(1.340) 
Log Real GDP per 
capita 
.175** 
(.071) 
.212* 
(.115) 
.578 
(2.189) 
.168** 
(.071) 
.205* 
(.116) 
.578 
(2.189) 
Ethnolinguistic diversity .108 
(.198) 
-.002 
(.265) 
-5.793 
(5.507) 
.110 
(.197) 
.001 
(.265) 
-5.793 
(5.507) 
Corruption perception 
index  
.097** 
(.037) 
.125** 
(.058) 
.323 
(1.022) 
.098** 
(.037) 
.127** 
(.058) 
.323 
(1.022) 
Number of contiguous 
countries 
-.012 
(.023) 
-.007 
(.034) 
.440 
(.644) 
-.009 
(.023) 
-.004 
(.034) 
.440 
(.644) 
Log age of the country .379** 
(.098) 
.548** 
(.160) 
6.283** 
(2.525) 
.384** 
(.100) 
.127** 
(.058) 
6.283** 
(2.525) 
Common Law Country .168* 
(.095) 
.041 
(.151) 
-1.548 
(3.000) 
-.153* 
(.095) 
-.004 
(.034) 
-1.548 
(3.000) 
Religious Law Country  .108 
(.139) 
.121 
(.197) 
2.201 
(3.556) 
.111 
(.141) 
.124 
(.199) 
2.201 
(3.556) 
Including U.S.? Yes Yes Yes No No No 
R-square .8143 .8002 .6743 .8045 .7911 .6743 
 N 114 114 114 113 113 113 
Note: Each regression also includes a constant and fixed effects for continents whose coefficients are not reported to conserve 
space. ** denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, and * denotes coefficients significant at the 10% level. Coefficients and 
in parentheses standard errors. 
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Table 2 (cont.): Ordinary Least Squares Regressions: Treaties as a Function of Country Characteristics 
B. Multilateral Treaties 
 
Log UN 
Multilateral 
Treaties 
(1) 
Log Non-UN 
Multilateral 
Treaties 
 (2) 
% of Multilateral 
Treaties are non-
UN  
 (3) 
Log UN 
Multilateral 
Treaties 
(4) 
Log Non-UN 
Multilateral 
Treaties 
 (5) 
% of Multilateral 
Treaties are non-
UN  
(6) 
Log Population .012 
(.073) 
.245** 
(.053) 
4.049** 
(1.233) 
.018 
(.075) 
.252** 
(.054) 
4.113** 
(1.267) 
Log Real GDP per 
capita 
.141** 
(.072) 
.177** 
(.087) 
.873 
(1.971) 
.146** 
(.072) 
.183** 
(.087) 
.928 
(1.940) 
Ethnolinguistic 
diversity 
.050 
(.212) 
.290 
(.271) 
4.647 
(6.183) 
.048 
(.210) 
.289 
(.272) 
4.631 
(6.209) 
Corruption 
perception index  
.027 
(.038) 
.123** 
(.051) 
1.922* 
(1.157) 
.027 
(.038) 
.122** 
(.051) 
1.912* 
(1.160) 
Number of 
contiguous 
countries 
.017 
(.019) 
-.050* 
(.030) 
-1.352** 
(.688) 
.015 
(.019) 
-.052 
(.030) 
1.370** 
(.685) 
Log age of the 
country 
.175 
(.142) 
.378** 
(.098) 
5.856** 
(2.352) 
.172 
(.143) 
.375** 
(.098) 
5.825** 
(2.359) 
Common Law 
Country 
.134 
(.122) 
.081 
(.116) 
-2.071 
(2.755) 
.144 
(.123) 
.093 
(.116) 
-1.1953 
(2.774) 
Religious Law 
Country  
.070 
(.210) 
.026 
(.164) 
.195 
(3.755) 
.068 
(.209) 
.024 
(.163) 
.171 
(3.755) 
Including U.S.? Yes Yes Yes No No No 
R-square .2488 .7115 .5073 .2506 .7069 .4994 
 N 114 114 114 113 113 113 
Note: Each regression also includes a constant and fixed effects for continents whose coefficients are not reported to conserve 
space. ** denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, and * denotes coefficients significant at the 10% level. Coefficients and 
in parentheses standard errors. 
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Table 2 (cont.): Ordinary Least Squares Regressions: Treaties as a Function of Country Characteristics 
C. Reservations on UN Multilateral Treaties 
 
Log Reservations 
(1) 
% of UN 
Multilateral 
Treaties Having 
Reservations  
(2) 
Log Reservations 
(3) 
% of UN 
Multilateral 
Treaties Having 
Reservations 
(4) 
Log Population .018 
(.054) 
.652 
(1.092) 
.026 
(.056) 
.720 
(1.128) 
Log Real GDP per capita .103* 
(.068) 
-.765 
(.935) 
.110* 
(.067) 
-.707 
(.936) 
Ethnolinguistic diversity -.023 
(.177) 
-1.689 
(2.354) 
-.025 
(.174) 
-1.705 
(2.372) 
Corruption perception index  .016 
(.032) 
-.396 
(.416) 
.015 
(.032) 
-.407 
(.422) 
Number of contiguous countries .014 
(.014) 
-.114 
(.270) 
.012 
(.015) 
-1.340 
(.273) 
Log age of the country .139 
(.100) 
-2.044 
(2.131) 
.135 
(.101) 
-2.079 
(2.149) 
Common Law Country .112 
(.105) 
-.732 
(1.164) 
.127 
(.106) 
-.607 
(1.163) 
Religious Law Country  .003 
(.152) 
2.813 
(3.008) 
.000 
(.152) 
-2.839 
(3.032) 
Including U.S.? Yes Yes No No 
R-square .2931 .0923 .3007 .0971 
 N 114 114 113 113 
Note: Each regression also includes a constant and fixed effects for continents whose coefficients are not reported to conserve 
space. ** denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, and * denotes coefficients significant at the 10% level. Coefficients and 
in parentheses standard errors. 
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Table 2 (cont.) Ordinary Least Squares Regressions: Treaties as a Function of Country Characteristics 
D. Economic Treaties 
 
 
% of Treaties Economic 
(1) 
% of Treaties Bilateral 
and Economic 
(2) 
% of Treaties UN 
Multilateral and 
Economic 
(3) 
% of Treaties Non-UN 
Multilateral and 
Economic 
(4) 
Log Population 2.187** 
(.572) 
.957* 
(.740) 
.794 
(.654) 
1.519** 
(.734) 
Log Real GDP per capita -3.710** 
(1.140) 
-6.566** 
(1.449) 
-.555 
(1.148) 
.175 
(1.557) 
Ethnolinguistic diversity 1.603 
(3.281) 
4.179 
(3.057) 
1.554 
(3.230) 
3.286 
(5.112) 
Corruption perception 
index  
1.449** 
(.518) 
1.141** 
(.563) 
.670 
(.463) 
.861 
(.546) 
Number of contiguous 
countries 
-.447 
(.292) 
-.921** 
(.361) 
-.509* 
(.263) 
-.281 
(.388) 
Log age of the country 2.673** 
(1.075) 
1.215 
(1.161) 
.611 
(1.189) 
2.829** 
(1.314) 
Common Law Country .860 
(1.583) 
1.159 
(1.709) 
.223 
(1.926) 
3.100 
(2.417) 
Religious Law Country  2.618 
(3.470) 
2.796 
(2.921) 
5.098* 
(2.743) 
-.326 
(5.834) 
R-square .6379 .5684 .3160 .3608 
 N 114 114 114 114 
Note: Each regression also includes a constant and fixed effects for continents whose coefficients are not reported to conserve 
space. ** denotes coefficients significant at the 5% level, and * denotes coefficients significant at the 10% level. 
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